THE CORE AS A SOLUTION TO EXCLUSIONARY NETWORKS

被引:83
作者
BIENENSTOCK, EJ
BONACICH, P
机构
[1] Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0378-8733(92)90003-P
中图分类号
Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
030303 ;
摘要
The core is a game theory solution concept that is applicable to exclusionary (negatively connected) exchange networks. The core makes only the minimal assumptions of individual and coalitional rationality. The core describes who should exchange with whom and what the terms of the exchanges should be. Unlike other algorithms that have been applied to exclusionary exchange networks, the core applies to a wider variety of problems than any single competing procedure previously proposed. It can easily be extended to handle a variety of situations: more than one exchange per round; relationships having unequal values; positions having sources of reward other than exchange; and situations where more than one exchange is required. Moreover, networks in which the core is empty should experience particular difficulty in reaching agreement about exchanges.
引用
收藏
页码:231 / 243
页数:13
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