LABOR TURNOVER, WAGE STRUCTURES, AND MORAL HAZARD - THE INEFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS

被引:18
作者
ARNOTT, RJ [1 ]
STIGLITZ, JE [1 ]
机构
[1] PRINCETON UNIV,PRINCETON,NJ 08544
关键词
D O I
10.1086/298064
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
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页码:434 / 462
页数:29
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