THE AGENT-AGENTS PROBLEM - PAYMENT BY RELATIVE OUTPUT

被引：49

作者：

CARMICHAEL, HL

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/298004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：50 / 65

页数：16

共 15 条

[1]

ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2]

Friedman J., 1977, OLIGOPOLY THEORY GAM

[3]

GREEN J, 1981, 862 HARV U DEP EC DI

[4] INCENTIVES IN TEAMS [J].

GROVES, T .

[5]

HALL RE, 1981, INEFFICIENCY MARGINA

[6] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J].

HARRIS, M ;

RAVIV, A .

[7]

HOLMSTROM B, 1981, 471 NW U CTR MATH ST

[8]

LAFFONT JJ, 1981, THEORY INCENTIVES OV

[9] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J].

LAZEAR, EP ;

ROSEN, S .

MIRRLEES, JA .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1976, 7 (01) :105-131