EXECUTIVE EFFORT AND SELECTION OF RISKY PROJECTS

被引：174

作者：

LAMBERT, RA

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555629

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：77 / 88

页数：12

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