MERGERS OF PRODUCERS OF PERFECT COMPLEMENTS COMPETING IN PRICE

被引:24
作者
GAUDET, G [1 ]
SALANT, SW [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV MICHIGAN,ANN ARBOR,MI 48109
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(92)90274-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The endogenous merger model of Kamien and Zang (QJE, 1990) is generalized to price competition with perfect complements and used to show that some socially desirable mergers will fail to occur. We also clarify the link between this merger model and the 'exogenous merger' literature.
引用
收藏
页码:359 / 364
页数:6
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