COUNTERVAILING INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS

被引：218

作者：

LEWIS, TR ^{[1
]}

SAPPINGTON, DEM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BELLCORE,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1989年 / 49卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：294 / 313

页数：20

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