OLIGOPOLISTIC INCENTIVES FOR POLLUTION-CONTROL WITH NONZERO CONJECTURES

被引:11
作者
LEE, SH
KIM, JC
机构
[1] Department of Management and Policy, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Taejon, 305-701, 373-1 Kusong-dong, Yusong-gu
关键词
OLIGOPOLISTIC INCENTIVES; NONZERO CONJECTURES; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(94)00652-I
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper presents an oligopolistic tax/subsidy scheme for pollution control, which incorporates nonzero conjectures to characterize correct incentives for situations where nonzero conjectures are formed by the polluters with respect to others' pollution-generating activities.
引用
收藏
页码:95 / 99
页数:5
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