The delivery and control of quality in supplier producer contracts

被引：209

作者：

Reyniers, DJ ^{[1
]}

Tapiero, CS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] ESSEC,F-95021 CERGY,FRANCE

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 1995年 / 41卷 / 10期

关键词：

quality control; inspection; game theory;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.41.10.1581

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We model the effect of contract parameters such as price rebates and after-sales warranty costs on the choice of quality by a supplier, the inspection policy of a producer, and the resulting end product quality. Both noncooperative and cooperative settings are explored. The paper's contribution is to highlight the importance of strategic and contractual issues in quality management.

引用

页码：1581 / 1589

页数：9