SUSTAINABLE PLANS

被引：188

作者：

CHARI, VV ^{[1
]}

KEHOE, PJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MINNESOTA,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1990年 / 98卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/261706

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：783 / 802

页数：20

共 18 条

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