ADVERTISING AND PRICING TO DETER OR ACCOMMODATE ENTRY WHEN DEMAND IS UNKNOWN

被引：37

作者：

BAGWELL, K ^{[1
]}

RAMEY, G ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1990年 / 8卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(89)90036-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider the advertising and pricing strategies of an incumbent firm who is concerned with deterring or accommodating entry and privately informed as to the level of market demand. Our fundamental result is that a demand-exaggerating distortion occurs: if the incumbent seeks to signal a low (high) demand, then he behaves as if there were complete information but demand were lower (higher) than it is. Pre-entry pricing and demand-enhancing advertising are therefore distorted downward (upward), as a consequence of signaling. Purely dissipative advertising is thus not employed as a signal. Refinements of sequential equilibrium are featured. © 1990.

引用

页码：93 / 113

页数：21

共 21 条

[1]

BAGWELL K, 1987, RAND J ECON, V19, P59

[2]

Bain JS, 1956, BARRIERS NEW COMPETI, DOI 10.4159/harvard.9780674188037

[3]

CHO I, 1986, UNPUB EQUILIBRIUM AN

[4]

CHO I, 1987, Q J EC MAY, P179