Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation

被引：33

作者：

Ball, L

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 1995年 / 36卷 / 02期

关键词：

inflation;

D O I：

10.1016/0304-3932(95)01218-4

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper presents a model of dynamically consistent monetary policy that explains changes in inflation over time. In the model - as in the postwar United States - adverse supply shocks trigger increases in inflation. High inflation persists until a tough policy-maker causes a recession to disinflate. The paper also proposes an approach to selecting a unique equilibrium in infinite-horizon models of monetary policy.

引用

页码：329 / 350

页数：22

共 22 条

[1] THE POLITICS OF AMBIGUITY [J].