OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING AND ADVERTISING

被引:68
作者
STAHL, DO
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Texas, Austin
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1994.1060
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
N sellers advertise a homogeneous good to M buyers whose only source of information is this advertising. There is a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which sellers choose a common advertising level and mix over prices. This NE approaches marginal cost priing as advertising costs decrease, and approaches monopoly pricing as advertising costs increase. More sellers induce lower prices and less advertising per seller; however, the social welfare effect can be negative for some advertising technologies. The NE advertising level is generically less than socially optimal.
引用
收藏
页码:162 / 177
页数:16
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