PARETO OPTIMA AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD

被引：228

作者：

PRESCOTT, EC ^{[1
]}

TOWNSEND, RM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV,PITTSBURGH,PA 15213

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911459

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：21 / 45

页数：25

共 23 条

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