PEER PRESSURE AND PARTNERSHIPS

被引:878
作者
KANDEL, E
LAZEAR, EP
机构
[1] UNIV CHICAGO,CHICAGO,IL 60637
[2] HOOVER INST WAR REVOLUT & PEACE,STANFORD,CA 94305
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1086/261840
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie. But in organizations of any significant size, the free-rider effects would seem to choke off any motivational forces. This analysis explores how peer pressure operates and how factors such as profit sharing, shame, guilt, norms, mutual monitoring, and empathy interact to create incentives in the firm. The argument that Japanese firms enjoy team spirit because compensation is linked to overall profitability is analyzed. An explanation for the prevalence of partnerships among individuals in similar occupations is provided.
引用
收藏
页码:801 / 817
页数:17
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