PARETO OPTIMALITY OF POLICY PROPOSALS WITH PROBABILISTIC VOTING

被引：30

作者：

COUGHLIN, P

机构：

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1982年 / 39卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00118799

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：427 / 433

页数：7

共 20 条

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