REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH LENDING AND BORROWING

被引：67

作者：

ALLEN, F

机构：

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1985年 / 17卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(85)90121-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：27 / 31

页数：5

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