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THE 1ST ORDER APPROACH TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS

被引：360
作者：
ROGERSON, WP
机构：
来源：
ECONOMETRICA | 1985年 / 53卷 / 06期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1913212
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：1357 / 1367
页数：11
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