BOUNDED COMPLEXITY JUSTIFIES COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA

被引：177

作者：

NEYMAN, A

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(85)90026-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：227 / 229

页数：3

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