THEORY AND BEHAVIOR OF MULTIPLE UNIT DISCRIMINATIVE AUCTIONS

被引：39

作者：

COX, JC

SMITH, VL

WALKER, JM

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 1984年 / 39卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2327608

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：983 / 1010

页数：28

共 21 条

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