A NOTE ON REACTIVE EQUILIBRIA IN THE DISCOUNTED PRISONERS-DILEMMA AND ASSOCIATED GAMES

被引：13

作者：

KALAI, E

SAMET, D

STANFORD, W

机构：

[1] BAR ILAN UNIV,RAMAT GAN,ISRAEL

[2] UNIV ILLINOIS,URBANA,IL 61801

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01242860

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：177 / 186

页数：10

共 7 条

[1]

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[2]

Aumann R, 1981, ESSAYS GAME THEORY M

[3] EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J].

AXELROD, R .

[4] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J].

KREPS, DM ;

MILGROM, P ;

ROBERTS, J ;

WILSON, R .

[5] EQUILIBRIUM IN SUPERGAMES WITH THE OVERTAKING CRITERION [J].

RUBINSTEIN, A .

[6]

RUBINSTEIN A, 1979, APPLIED GAME THEORY

[7]

Selton R., 1975, INT J GAME THEORY, V4, P22