RESOLVING DOUBLE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEMS WITH BUYOUT AGREEMENTS

被引：87

作者：

DEMSKI, JS ^{[1
]}

SAPPINGTON, DEM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV FLORIDA,GAINESVILLE,FL 32611

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1991年 / 22卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2601019

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：232 / 240

页数：9

共 17 条

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