LOCAL-GOVERNMENT INEFFICIENCY AND THE TIEBOUT HYPOTHESIS - DOES COMPETITION AMONG MUNICIPALITIES LIMIT LOCAL-GOVERNMENT INEFFICIENCY

被引:14
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HOYT, WH
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10.2307/1060625
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F [经济];
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02 ;
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页码:481 / 496
页数:16
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