MULTITASK PRINCIPAL AGENT ANALYSES - INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND JOB DESIGN

被引:2598
作者
HOLMSTROM, B [1 ]
MILGROM, P [1 ]
机构
[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305
关键词
D O I
10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:24 / 52
页数:29
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