On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles

被引：1

作者：

Ruth Martínez

Jordi Massó

Alejandro Neme

Jorge Oviedo

机构：

[1] Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET,Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis

[2] Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica and CODE

来源：

International Journal of Game Theory | 2008年 / 36卷

关键词：

Matching; Stability; Substitutable preferences; Semilattice; C78; D71; D78;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

For the many-to-one matching model we give a procedure to partition the set of substitutable preference profiles into equivalence classes with the property that all profiles in the same class have the same set of stable matchings. This partition allows to reduce the amount of information required by centralized stable mechanisms.

引用

页码：497 / 518

页数：21

共 27 条

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