Over-investment of free cash flow

被引：2353

作者：

Scott Richardson

机构：

[1] University of Pennsylvania,Wharton School

来源：

Review of Accounting Studies | 2006年 / 11卷

关键词：

Free cash flow; Over-investment; Agency costs; G3; M4;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper examines the extent of firm level over-investment of free cash flow. Using an accounting-based framework to measure over-investment and free cash flow, I find evidence that, consistent with agency cost explanations, over-investment is concentrated in firms with the highest levels of free cash flow. Further tests examine whether firms’ governance structures are associated with over-investment of free cash flow. The evidence suggests that certain governance structures, such as the presence of activist shareholders, appear to mitigate over-investment.

引用

页码：159 / 189

页数：30

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