The public interest theory of regulation: Non-existence or misinterpretation?

被引:17
作者
Michael Hantke-Domas
机构
[1] Center for Competition and Regulation, University of East Anglia, Norwich, Norfolk
关键词
History of microeconomics; Law and economics of regulated industries; Public interest; Regulation; Theories of regulation; Welfare economics;
D O I
10.1023/A:1021814416688
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The Public Interest Theory of regulation explains, in general terms, that regulation seeks the protection and benefit of the public at large. This paper argues that possibly the Public Interest Theory does not exist as such for reasons that will be discussed later. In addition, the paper contends that the Stigler's and Posner's characterisation of the Public Interest Theory has similarities with the welfare economics rationale for regulation. Nevertheless, the similarities do not prove or deny a connection between both the concepts of public interest and the welfare economics rationale for regulation. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
引用
收藏
页码:165 / 194
页数:29
相关论文
共 81 条
[1]  
1 Lloyd's Rep. 692 QDB, (1960)
[2]  
Anderson G., Tollison R., Congressional influence and patterns of new deal expending, Journal of Law & Economics, 34, pp. 161-175, (1991)
[3]  
Aranson P., Theories of economic regulation: From clarity to confusion, Journal of Law & Politics, 6, pp. 247-286, (1990)
[4]  
Bailey T., Kennedy D., Cohen L., The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, 11th Edn., (1998)
[5]  
Bannock, Baxter, Davis, The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, (1998)
[6]  
Barr N., The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd Edn., (1998)
[7]  
Bator F., The anatomy of market failure, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72, pp. 351-379, (1958)
[8]  
Becker G., A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 3, pp. 371-400, (1983)
[9]  
Becker G., The public interest hypothesis revisited: A new test of Peltzman's theory of regulation, Public Choice, 49, pp. 223-234, (1986)
[10]  
Benedict M., Law and Regulation in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, (1998)