CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations

被引：8

作者：

Hee-Jung Yeo

Christine Pochet

Alain Alcouffe

机构：

[1] Université de Toulouse I,Maitre de Conferences

[2] IES,undefined

来源：

Journal of Management and Governance | 2003年 / 7卷 / 1期

关键词：

boards of directors; CEOs; French corporate governance; interlocking directorates; outside directors;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1022442602193

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In France the chairperson of the board is mostoften the firm's CEO. This position strengthensthe insiders' hold on the board of directors.Moreover, a large fraction of outside directorsis composed of CEOs of other firms. Thereciprocal interlocking of CEOs creates the possibility of mutual interdependence of CEOs.We investigate factors explaining reciprocalinterlocking directorates of CEOs in Frenchcorporations. Our results indicate that CEOs oflarger firms hold more reciprocal CEOinterlocks and when CEOs have more outsidedirectorships, CEOs hold more reciprocalrelationships. We also find a positiverelationship between the number of CEOsreciprocal interlocks and their firms'performance measured by ROA. We find evidencethat CEOs hold more reciprocal interlocks whena blockholder is present on the CEO's board.

引用

页码：87 / 108

页数：21

共 60 条

[1]

Allen M.(1974)The Structure of Interlocking Elite Cooptation: Interlocking Corporate Directories American Sociological Review 39 393-406

[2]

Alexander J.A.(1993)Leadership Instability in Hospitals: The Influence of Board-CEO Relations and Organizational Growth and Decline AdministrativeScience Quarterly 38 74-99

[3]

Fennell M.L.(2001)Innovation and Industrial Renewal in France in Comparative Perspective Industry and Innovation 8 113-133

[4]

Halpern M.T.(1990)The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control Academy of Management Review 15 72-87

[5]

Amable B.(1992)Power and Managerial Dismissal: Scapegoating at the Top Administrative Science Quarterly 37 400-421

[6]

Hancke B.(1996)Factors Affecting the Number of Outside Directorships Held by CEOs Journal of Financial Economics 40 81-104

[7]

Baysinger B.D.(1999)Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance Journal of financial Economics 51 371-406

[8]

Hoskisson R.E.(1957)The Concept of Power Behavioral Science 2 201-215

[9]

Boeker W.(1969)The Interlocking Directorate American Economic Review 59-3 314-323

[10]

Booth J.(1983)Separation of Ownership and Control Journal of Law and Economics 26 301-325

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 →