Stock options and capital structure

被引：7

作者：

MacMinn R.D. ^{[1
]}

Page Jr. F.H. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Finance, Insurance, and Law, Illinois State University, Normal

[2] Department of Finance, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

来源：

Annals of Finance | 2006年 / 2卷 / 1期

关键词：

Capital structure; Convexity and risk; Managerial compensation; Pecking order theory; Stock options;

D O I：

10.1007/s10436-005-0029-4

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We show that value-maximizing CEOs compensated with stock options prefer debt to equity. Our pecking order result does not depend on managerial risk aversion, managerial firm-specific human capital, or asymmetric information. Moreover, our result holds at least weakly regardless of the distribution of firm cash flows and strictly as long as the support of the cash flow distribution is big enough to bring all features of the stock option contract into play with positive probability. © Springer 2005.

引用

页码：39 / 50

页数：11

共 19 条

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