The institutional-evolutionary antitrust model

被引:1
作者
Mantzavinos C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Faculty of Management and Economics, Witten/Herdecke University, 58448 Witten
关键词
Antitrust; Competition; Competition policy; Evolution; Institutions;
D O I
10.1007/s10657-006-0399-8
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals. © Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006.
引用
收藏
页码:273 / 291
页数:18
相关论文
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