Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy

被引:42
作者
Jozef Konings
Hylke Vandenbussche
Linda Springael
机构
[1] University of Leuven (KULeuven),
[2] University of Antwerp,undefined
关键词
antidumping measures; trade diversion; econometric testing;
D O I
10.1023/A:1015269804381
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper studies empirically the effects of European antidumping cases on trade diversion from importers “named” in an antidumping investigation, to countries “not named” in the investigation. For this purpose we use a unique data set at the 8-digit product level. The amount of import diversion can be regarded as an indication of the effectiveness of antidumping policy. We find that trade diversion in the European Union caused by antidumping actions—in contrast to the United States—is limited, suggesting that the European Union's antidumping policy is more effective in keeping imports out. This result holds even after controlling for selection bias in the antidumping investigation procedure. A number of explanations for this difference in trade diversion as a result of antidumping policy between the European Union and United States are formulated.
引用
收藏
页码:283 / 299
页数:16
相关论文
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