Consumer returns policies with endogenous deadline and supply chain coordination

被引:119
作者
Xu, Lei [1 ,2 ]
Li, Yongjian [2 ]
Govindan, Kannan [3 ]
Xu, Xiaolin [4 ]
机构
[1] Tianjin Univ Technol, Sch Management, Tianjin 300384, Peoples R China
[2] Nankai Univ, Sch Business, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Southern Denmark, Dept Econ & Business, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
[4] Nanjing Univ, Sch Business, Nanjing 210093, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Supply chain management; Consumer behavior; Product returns; Return deadline; Buy-back contract; QUALITY; INFORMATION; STRATEGIES; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejor.2014.09.049
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper considers returns policies under which consumers' valuation depends on the refund amount they receive and the length of time they must wait after the item is returned. Consumers face an uncertain valuation before purchase, and the realization of that purchase's value occurs only after the return deadline has passed. Depending on the product lifecycle length and magnitude of return rate, a retailer decides on strategies for that product's return deadline, including return prohibition, life-cycle return, and fixed return deadline. In addition, the influence of the return deadline on consumers' behavior and the pricing and inventory policies of the retailer are systematically investigated. Moreover, based on the analysis of consumer return behavior on a traditional buy-back contract, we present a new differentiated buy-back contract, contingent on return deadline, to coordinate a supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer. Finally, extensions on some specific behavioral factors such as moral hazard, inertia return, and external effect are investigated. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:88 / 99
页数:12
相关论文
共 57 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], HARVARD BUSINESS REV
[2]   Optimal pricing of seasonal products in the presence of forward-looking consumers [J].
Aviv, Yossi ;
Pazgal, Amit .
M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, 2008, 10 (03) :339-359
[3]   Information, contracting, and quality costs [J].
Baiman, S ;
Fischer, PE ;
Rajan, MV .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2000, 46 (06) :776-789
[4]  
Bandyopadhyay S., 2012, MARKET SCI, V29, P846
[5]   Decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty [J].
Bernstein, F ;
Federgruen, A .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2005, 51 (01) :18-29
[6]   The benefit of information asymmetry: When to sell to informed customers? [J].
Bhargava, Hemant K. ;
Chen, Rachel R. .
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, 2012, 53 (02) :345-356
[7]   Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers [J].
Cachon, Gerard P. ;
Swinney, Robert .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2009, 55 (03) :497-511
[8]  
Cachon GP, 2003, HDBK OPER R, V11, P229, DOI 10.1016/s0927-0507(03)11006-7
[9]   Customer return policies for experience goods [J].
Che, YK .
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1996, 44 (01) :17-24
[10]   The impact of customer returns on decisions in a newsvendor problem with and without buyback policies [J].
Chen, Jing ;
Bell, Peter .
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2011, 18 (04) :473-491