Creditor rights, information sharing, and bank risk taking

被引:514
作者
Houston, Joel F. [1 ]
Lin, Chen [2 ]
Lin, Ping [3 ]
Ma, Yue [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Florida, Warrington Coll Business Adm, Dept Finance Insurance & Real Estate, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Lingnan Univ, Dept Econ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Creditor rights; Information sharing; Bank risk taking; Financial crisis; Economic growth; FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; GROWTH; COMPETITION; CRISES; DISCIPLINE; FIRM; LAW;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.02.008
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Looking at a sample of nearly 2,400 banks in 69 countries, we find that stronger creditor rights tend to promote greater bank risk taking. Consistent with this finding, we also show that stronger creditor rights increase the likelihood of financial crisis. On the plus side, we find that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher growth. In contrast, we find that the benefits of information sharing among creditors appear to be universally positive. Greater information sharing leads to higher bank profitability, lower bank risk, a reduced likelihood of financial crisis, and higher economic growth. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:485 / 512
页数:28
相关论文
共 63 条
[1]   The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation [J].
Acemoglu, D ;
Johnson, S ;
Robinson, JA .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 91 (05) :1369-1401
[2]   Unbundling institutions [J].
Acemoglu, D ;
Johnson, S .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2005, 113 (05) :949-995
[3]  
Acharya V., 2009, 15569 NBER
[4]  
Allen F., 2008, CREDIT MARKET UNPUB
[5]  
Allen Franklin., 2000, Comparative Financial Systems
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2008, 08224 IMF
[7]  
[Anonymous], 2005, HDB EC GROWTH
[8]  
[Anonymous], 2006, 06297 IMF
[9]   ANOTHER LOOK AT THE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION OF ERROR-COMPONENTS MODELS [J].
ARELLANO, M ;
BOVER, O .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 1995, 68 (01) :29-51
[10]  
Barth J.R., 2006, RETHINKING BANK REGU