Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games

被引：16

作者：

Pazgal, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, JL Kellogg Grad Sch Management, Dept Managerial Econ & Decis Sci, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1997年 / 26卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01813884

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the play of mutual interests games by satisficing decision makers. We show that, for a high enough initial aspiration level, and under certain assumptions of "tremble," there is a high probability (close to unity) of convergence to the Pareto dominant cooperative outcome. Simulations indicate that the theoretical result is robust with respect to the "trembling" mechanism.

引用

页码：439 / 453

页数：15

共 24 条

[1] THE STRUCTURE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH FINITE AUTOMATA [J].