The impact of SFAS no. 131 on information and monitoring

被引:210
作者
Berger, PG [1 ]
Hann, R
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] Univ So Calif, Leventhal Sch Accounting, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1475-679X.00100
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the effect of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) new segment reporting standard on the information and monitoring environment. We compare hand-collected, restated SFAS 131 segment data for the final SFAS 14 fiscal year with the historical SFAS 14 data. We find that SFAS 131 increased the number of reported segments and provided more disaggregated information. Analysts and the market had access to a portion of the new segment information before it was made public, but analyst and market expectations were still altered by the mandated release of the new data. By increasing information disaggregation, the new standard induced firms to reveal previously "hidden" information about their diversification strategies. The newly revealed information affected market valuations and lead to changes in firm behavior consistent with improved monitoring following adoption of SFAS 131.
引用
收藏
页码:163 / 223
页数:61
相关论文
共 72 条
[1]  
Albrecht W. D., 1998, CPA J, V68, P46
[2]  
Alford AndrewW., 1999, J ACCOUNTING AUDITIN, V14, P219, DOI DOI 10.1177/0148558X9901400303
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1975, Markets and Hierarchies
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1999, Proprietary versus non-proprietary disclosures: Voluntary cash flow statements and business segment reports in Germany
[5]   Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics [J].
Barber, BM ;
Lyon, JD .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1997, 43 (03) :341-372
[6]  
BARYOSEF S, 2000, RASH HAHESHON
[7]  
BENS D, 2001, DISCLOSURE QUALITY D
[8]  
BERGER P, 2002, SEGMENT DISCLOSURES
[9]   DIVERSIFICATIONS EFFECT ON FIRM VALUE [J].
BERGER, PG ;
OFEK, E .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1995, 37 (01) :39-65
[10]  
BILLETT M, IN PRESS REV FINANCI