How do powerful CEOs view corporate risk-taking? Evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)

被引：33

作者：

Chintrakarn, Pandej ^{[1
]}

Jiraporn, Pornsit ^{[2
]}

Tong, Shenghui ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Mahidol Univ Int Coll, Nakhon Prathom, Thailand

[2] Penn State Univ, Great Valley Sch Grad Profess Studies, Malvern, PA 19355 USA

[3] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2015年 / 22卷 / 02期

关键词：

G32; G34; risk aversion; CEO power; CEO pay slice; powerful CEOs; risk-taking;

D O I：

10.1080/13504851.2014.927565

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We explore the role of powerful CEOs on the extent of risk-taking, using Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS). Based on more than 12,000 observations over 20 years (1992-2012), our results reveal a nonmonotonic association. In particular, relatively less powerful CEOs exhibit risk aversion, resulting in less risky strategies. However, when the CEO has his power consolidated beyond a certain point, he is less likely to compromise with other executives, leading to less moderate decisions and more risky strategies. We estimate that the CEO has to wield considerable power, that is, around the 75th percentile of CPS, before significantly more risk-taking is observed. Finally, we show that our results are unlikely vulnerable to endogeneity.

引用

页码：104 / 109

页数：6

共 13 条

[1] Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance [J].