Collective action and the evolution of social norms

被引:2110
作者
Ostrom, E [1 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Ctr Study Inst Populat & Environm Change, Bloomington, IN 47401 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.14.3.137
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I assume multiple types of players--"rational egoists," as well as "conditional cooperators" and "willing punishers"--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 158
页数:22
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