Coordination and local interaction: experimental evidence

被引：29

作者：

Keser, C ^{[1
]}

Ehrhart, KM ^{[1
]}

Berninghaus, SK ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Karlsruhe, Inst Stat & Math Wirtschaftstheorie, Rechenzentrum, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Germany

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1998年 / 58卷 / 03期

关键词：

coordination games; experimental economics;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00289-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbors around a circle eventually coordinated on the risk-dominant equilibrium. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.

引用

页码：269 / 275

页数：7

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