The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Firms in China

被引：87

作者：

Giannetti, Mariassunta ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Liao, Guanmin ^{[4
]}

You, Jiaxing ^{[5
]}

Yu, Xiaoyun ^{[6
]}

机构：

[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, Stockholm, Sweden

[2] CEPR, London, England

[3] ECGI, Brussels, Belgium

[4] Renmin Univ China, Sch Business, Beijing, Peoples R China

[5] Xiamen Univ, Sch Management, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China

[6] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCE | 2021年 / 25卷 / 03期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Corruption; Corporate governance; Capital and labor allocation; China; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; PERFORMANCE; GOVERNMENT; GROWTH;

D O I：

10.1093/rof/rfaa038

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Exploiting China's anti-corruption campaign, we show that following a decrease in corruption, firm performance improves. Small and young firms benefit more. We identify the channels through which corruption hampers firm performance. Following the anti-corruption campaign, the allocation of capital and labor becomes more efficient. Firms operating in ex ante more corrupt environments experience larger productivity gains, higher growth of sales, and lower cost of debt than other firms. Taken together, our results suggest that corruption is an inefficient equilibrium for an economy because it creates negative externalities.

引用

页码：629 / 667

页数：39

共 43 条

[1] Growth through Heterogeneous Innovations [J].

Akcigit, Ufuk ;

Kerr, William R. .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2018, 126 (04) :1374-1443

[2] Law, finance, and economic growth in China [J].

Allen, F ;

Qian, J ;

Qian, MJ .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2005, 77 (01) :57-116

[3] The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment [J].

Amore, Mario Daniele ;

Bennedsen, Morten .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2013, 110 (02) :387-402

[4]

[Anonymous], 2017, The New York Times

[5]

[Anonymous], 2016, NBER Working Paper No. 22801

[6]

[Anonymous], 2017, BBC 1023

[7] Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians [J].

Avis, Eric ;

Ferraz, Claudio ;

Finan, Frederico .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2018, 126 (05) :1912-1964

[8] The Impact of Bank Credit on Labor Reallocation and Aggregate Industry Productivity [J].

Bai, John ;

Carvalho, Daniel ;

Phillips, Gordon M. .

JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2018, 73 (06) :2787-2836

[9] The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying [J].

Borisov, Alexander ;

Goldman, Eitan ;

Gupta, Nandini .

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2016, 29 (04) :1039-1071

[10] Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms [J].

Cai, Hongbin ;

Fang, Hanming ;

Xu, Lixin Colin .

JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 2011, 54 (01) :55-78

← 1 2 3 4 5 →