Incentives in university technology transfers

被引:46
作者
Macho-Stadler, Ines [1 ]
Perez-Castrillo, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dep Econ, Bellaterra 08193, Spain
关键词
Licensing agreements; Spin-offs; Asymmetric information; CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES; VENTURE CAPITALISTS; CONTRACTS; INVENTIONS; INDUSTRY; IPOS; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.02.009
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:362 / 367
页数:6
相关论文
共 24 条
[1]   AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS APPROACH TO FINANCIAL CONTRACTING [J].
AGHION, P ;
BOLTON, P .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (03) :473-494
[2]   Risk sharing in licensing [J].
Bousquet, A ;
Cremer, H ;
Ivaldi, M ;
Wolkowicz, M .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 1998, 16 (05) :535-554
[3]   Financing and advising: Optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists [J].
Casamatta, C .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (05) :2059-2085
[4]   Venture capitalists, business angels, and performance of entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France [J].
Chahine, Salim ;
Filatotchev, Igor ;
Wright, Mike .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, 2007, 34 (3-4) :505-528
[5]  
Cockburn IM, 1998, J IND ECON, V46, P157
[6]   The role of academic technology transfer organizations in improving industry science links [J].
Debackere, K ;
Veugelers, R .
RESEARCH POLICY, 2005, 34 (03) :321-342
[7]  
DECHENAUX D, 2009, INVENTOR MORAL HAZAR
[8]   Shirking, sharing risk and shelving: The role of university license contracts [J].
Dechenaux, Emmanuel ;
Thursby, Marie ;
Thursby, Jerry .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2009, 27 (01) :80-91
[9]  
Fluck Z., 2006, VENTURE CAPITA UNPUB
[10]   TECHNOLOGY-TRANSFER UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J].
GALLINI, NT ;
WRIGHT, BD .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 21 (01) :147-160