Flexibility or Cost Saving? Sourcing Decisions with Two Suppliers

被引:37
作者
Chung, Wenming [1 ]
Talluri, Srinivas [2 ]
Narasimhan, Ram [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas El Paso, Coll Business Adm, Informat & Decis Sci Dept, El Paso, TX 79968 USA
[2] Michigan State Univ, Dept Supply Chain Management, Eli Broad Grad Sch Management, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
关键词
Dual Sourcing; Quantity Flexibility Contract; Supply Chain Contracts; System Performance; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; CHANNEL COORDINATION; CAPACITY INVESTMENT; CHAIN COORDINATION; CONTRACTS; QUANTITY; RETAILER; DEMAND; PRICE; PROCUREMENT;
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-5915.2010.00283.x
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This article studies a decentralized supply chain in which there are two suppliers and a single buyer. One supplier offers the quantity flexibility (QF) contract to the buyer, while the other offers the cheaper price. Under the QF contract, the buyer does not assume full responsibility for the forecast, yet the supplier guarantees the availability of the forecasted quantity with additional buffer inventory. On the other hand, the price-only contract places full inventory burden on the buyer, but with a cheaper price. We study this problem from the buyer's perspective and solve for the buyer's optimal procurement and forecasting decisions. We identify areas where flexibility and cheaper price have an advantage, one over the other. Our results indicate that the buyer significantly benefits from having multiple sources of supply. We also find that, from the system's standpoint, a multisupplier system may outperform a single-supplier supply chain under certain conditions. Interestingly, we observe that providing too much flexibility may benefit the low-price supplier rather than benefiting the QF supplier. We discuss the managerial implications and provide directions for future research opportunities.
引用
收藏
页码:623 / 650
页数:28
相关论文
共 30 条
[1]  
Baiman S., 2004, INCENTIVE EFFECT MUL
[2]   Decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty [J].
Bernstein, F ;
Federgruen, A .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2005, 51 (01) :18-29
[3]   Competing Manufacturers in a Retail Supply Chain: On Contractual Form and Coordination [J].
Cachon, Gerard P. ;
Koek, A. Guerhan .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2010, 56 (03) :571-589
[4]   Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations [J].
Cachon, GP ;
Lariviere, MA .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2005, 51 (01) :30-44
[5]   The allocation of inventory risk in a supply chain: Push, pull, and advance-purchase discount contracts [J].
Cachon, GP .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2004, 50 (02) :222-238
[6]   Auctioning supply contracts [J].
Chen, Fangruo .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2007, 53 (10) :1562-1576
[7]   PRICE-COMPETITION IN A CHANNEL STRUCTURE WITH A COMMON RETAILER [J].
CHOI, SC .
MARKETING SCIENCE, 1991, 10 (04) :271-296
[8]   A supplier's optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information [J].
Corbett, CJ ;
de Groote, X .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2000, 46 (03) :444-450
[9]   Efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes [J].
Donohue, KL .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2000, 46 (11) :1397-1411
[10]   Supplier commitment and production decisions under a forecast-commitment contract [J].
Durango-Cohen, EJ ;
Yano, CA .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2006, 52 (01) :54-67