The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations

被引：471

作者：

Gomez-Mejia, LR ^{[1
]}

Larraza-Kintana, M

Makri, M

机构：

[1] Arizona State Univ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA

[2] Univ Publ Navarra, Navarra, Spain

来源：

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 2003年 / 46卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.5465/30040616

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Family-member CEOs of family-controlled firms receive lower total income than outsider CEOs, increasingly so as family ownership concentration increases. At the same time, their pay tends to be more insulated from risk and more sensitive to systematic (less controllable) business risk. The presence of institutional investors and R&D intensity play important moderating roles in these relationships.

引用

页码：226 / 237

页数：12

共 42 条

[1] POWER, PERFORMANCE, AND SUCCESSION IN THE LARGE CORPORATION [J].