Is there a rationale for output-based rebating of environmental levies?

被引：47

作者：

Bernard, Alain L.

Fischer, Carolyn

Fox, Alan K.

机构：

[1] Resources Future Inc, Washington, DC 20036 USA

[2] Minist Transportat & Housing, F-92055 Paris, France

[3] US Int Trade Commiss, Washington, DC 20436 USA

来源：

RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS | 2007年 / 29卷 / 02期

关键词：

environmental tax; rebate; fiscal distortions; emissions permit allocation; carbon leakage;

D O I：

10.1016/j.reseneeco.2006.07.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Political pressure often exists for rebating environmental levies, particularly when incomplete regulatory coverage allegedly creates an "unlevel playing field" with other, unregulated firms or industries. This paper assesses the conditions under which rebating environmental levies is justified for the regulated sector, combining a theoretical approach with numerical simulations parameterized to reflect the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Rebates are undesired if one can instead tax the production of the unregulated sector. Otherwise, rebating is justified only when the goods of the competing sectors are close substitutes with similar emissions profiles. Policy constraints are costly in terms of welfare and environmental effectiveness. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：83 / 101

页数：19

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