A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

被引：21

作者：

Dagan, N

Volij, O

Winter, E

机构：

[1] Acad Prior Ltd, IL-52015 Ramat Gan, Israel

[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Econ, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel

[3] Iowa State Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Econ, Ames, IA 50011 USA

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2002年 / 19卷 / 04期

关键词：

Disagreement Point; Bargaining Solution; Rational Alternative; Nash Bargaining Solution; Irrelevant Alternative;

D O I：

10.1007/s003550200159

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

引用

页码：811 / 823

页数：13

共 16 条

[1] THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION IN ECONOMIC MODELING [J].