Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations

被引：33

作者：

Anderson, Axel ^{[1
]}

Smith, Lones ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Georgetown Univ, Washington, DC 20057 USA

[2] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2010年 / 77卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

EARNINGS; INCENTIVES; SEARCH; RISK;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00567.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper introduces a general model of matching that includes evolving public Bayesian reputations and stochastic production. Despite productive complementarity, assortative matching robustly fails for high discount factors, unlike in Becker (1973). This failure holds around the highest (lowest) reputation agents for "high skill" ("low skill") technologies. We find that matches of likes eventually dissolve. In another life-cycle finding, young workers are paid less than their marginal product, and old workers more. Also, wages rise with tenure but need not reflect marginal products: information rents produce non-monotone and discontinuous wage profiles.

引用

页码：3 / 29

页数：27

共 25 条

[1]

ANDERSON A, 2007, EXPLOSIVE EXTR UNPUB

[2]

[Anonymous], 1998, Supermodularity and complementarity

[3] Assortative matching with explicit search costs [J].