Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions

被引：27

作者：

Hafalir, Isa ^{[2
]}

Krishna, Vijay ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15217 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 45卷 / 9-10期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Auctions; Asymmetries; Resale; 1ST PRICE AUCTIONS; ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; EQUILIBRIA; GAMES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.04.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study first-price auctions in a model with asymmetric, independent private values. Asymmetries lead to inefficient allocations, thereby creating a motive for resale after the auction is over. In Our model, resale takes place via monopoly pricing-the winner of the auction makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. Our goal is to compare equilibria of the first-price auction without resale (FPA) with those of the first-price auction with resale (FPAR). For the three major families of distributions for which equilibria of the FPA are available in closed form, we show that resale possibilities increase the revenue of the original seller. We also show by example that, somewhat paradoxically, resale may actually decrease efficiency. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：589 / 602

页数：14

共 18 条

[1] Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information [J].