Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs

被引：88

作者：

Vereshchagina, Galina ^{[1
]}

Hopenhayn, Hugo A. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Arizona State Univ, Dept Econ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA

[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2009年 / 99卷 / 05期

关键词：

PRIVATE EQUITY PREMIUM; FIRM DYNAMICS; LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS; INDIVISIBLE LABOR; EQUILIBRIUM; GROWTH; INVESTMENT; EMPLOYMENT; INDUSTRY; AVERSION;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.99.5.1808

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Entrepreneurs bear substantial risk, but empirical evidence shows no sign of a positive premium. This paper develops a theory of endogenous entrepreneurial risk taking that explains why self-financed entrepreneurs may find it optimal to invest in risky projects offering no risk premium. Consistently with empirical evidence, the model predicts that poorer entrepreneurs are more likely to undertake risky projects. It also finds that incentives for risk taking are stronger when agents are impatient. (JEL G31, G32, L25, L26)

引用

页码：1808 / 1830

页数：23

共 39 条

[1] UNINSURED IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK AND AGGREGATE SAVING [J].

AIYAGARI, SR .

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 109 (03) :659-684

[2]

AKYOL A, 2009, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, V905

[3] Optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics [J].

Albuquerque, R ;

Hopenhayn, HA .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2004, 71 (02) :285-315

[4] What makes an entrepreneur? [J].

Blanchflower, DG ;

Oswald, AJ .

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1998, 16 (01) :26-60

[5] Financial constraints and entrepreneurial investment [J].

Bohacek, Radim .

JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 2006, 53 (08) :1925-1942

[6]

Buera F., 2008, PERSISTENCY POVERTY

[7] Entrepreneurship, frictions, and wealth [J].

Cagetti, Marco ;

De Nardi, Mariacristina .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2006, 114 (05) :835-870

[8]

CAMPANALE C, 2008, PRIVATE EQUITY RETUR

[9] A theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics [J].

Clementi, GL ;

Hopenhayn, HA .

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2006, 121 (01) :229-265

[10] Aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability [J].

Cooley, T ;

Marimon, R ;

Quadrini, V .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2004, 112 (04) :817-847

← 1 2 3 4 →