Investor protection and corporate valuation

被引：2582

作者：

La Porta, R ^{[1
]}

Lopez-De-Silanes, F

Shleifer, A

Vishny, R

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[3] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2002年 / 57卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1540-6261.00457

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.

引用

页码：1147 / 1170

页数：24

共 41 条

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[Anonymous], J FINANCE

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BEBCHUK L, 1999, UNPUB RENT PROTECTIO

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