Modeling market mechanism with minority game

被引:119
作者
Challet, D [1 ]
Marsili, M
Zhang, YC
机构
[1] Univ Fribourg, Inst Theoret Phys, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
[2] INFM, Trieste SISSA Unit, I-34014 Trieste, Italy
来源
PHYSICA A | 2000年 / 276卷 / 1-2期
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0378-4371(99)00446-X
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
Using the minority game model we Study a broad spectrum of problems of market mechanism. We study the role of different types of agents: producers, speculators as well as noise traders. The central issue here is the information flow: producers feed in the information whereas speculators make it away. How well each agent fares in the common game depends on the market conditions, as well as their sophistication. Sometimes there is much to gain with little effort, sometimes great effort virtually brings no more incremental gain. Market impact is also shown to play an important role, a strategy should be judged when it is actually used in play for its quality. Though the minority game is an extremely simplified market model, it allows to ask, analyze and answer many questions which arise in real markets. (C) 2000 Elsevier science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:284 / 315
页数:32
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