Competition and financial stability

被引:512
作者
Allen, F [1 ]
Gale, D
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Dept Finance, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY USA
关键词
crises; banking concentration; dynamic; spatial; Schumpeterian competition;
D O I
10.1353/mcb.2004.0038
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Competition policy in the banking sector is complicated by the necessity of maintaining financial stability. Greater competition may be good for (static) efficiency, but bad for financial stability. From the point of view of welfare economics, the relevant question is: what are the efficient levels of competition and financial stability? We use a variety of models to address this question and find that different models provide different answers. The relationship between competition and stability is complex: sometimes competition increases stability. In addition, in a second-best world, concentration may be socially preferable to perfect competition and perfect stability may be socially undesirable.
引用
收藏
页码:453 / 480
页数:28
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