Trade diversion and declining tariffs: evidence from Mercosur

被引:45
作者
Bohara, AK
Gawande, K [1 ]
Sanguinetti, P
机构
[1] Texas A&M Univ, Bush Sch Govt, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[2] Univ New Mexico, Dept Econ, Albuquerque, NM 87131 USA
[3] Univ Torcuato Tella, Dept Econ, RA-1428 Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina
关键词
trade diversion; external tariffs; Mercosur;
D O I
10.1016/j.jinteco.2003.07.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper empirically examines the alternative posed by Richardson [J. Intern. Econ. 34 (1993) 39] to the traditional view that trade integration may exacerbate inefficiencies. Richardson's hypothesis boldly predicts that trade diversion (and trade creation) may actually cause tariffs to decline! The hypothesis is fundamentally attributable to the presence of a political component in the governments' objective functions. A cross-sectionally rich data set on trade and tariffs from the Mercosur-pact countries, primarily Argentina, is used. The evidence yields surprising conclusions about the validity of endogenous tariff determination in models of trade integration. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:65 / 88
页数:24
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